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URING the Survey period, a variety of environmental legal is-
sues were addressed in Texas state courts and federal courts. Of
particular interest, the U.S. Supreme Court decided two Texas
cases involving the right of contribution under the federal Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act and the
issue of preemption of private tort claims by the Federal Insecticide, Fun-
gicide, and Rodenticide Act. Other cases decided by federal and Texas
state courts included further review of the extent of jurisdiction under the
Clean Water Act, criminal environmental prosecution, many claims for
property damages and cleanup costs, and contractual liability, among
others.
II. COST RECOVERY CLAIMS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL TORTS
A. STATUTORY COST-RECOVERY CLAIMS
1. CERCLA Claims
Significant decisions from both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Texas
Supreme Court regarding environmental cost-recovery claims were
handed down during the Survey period. Indeed one of the most signifi-
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cant CERCLA1 cases issued in recent years, Cooper Industries, Inc. v.
Aviall Services, Inc.,2 addressed the ability of a private party who had
conducted remediation of hazardous-substance contamination to bring a
contribution action against other liable parties. The Aviall case centers
around the cleanup of four sites contaminated by the operations of both
Cooper Industries, Inc. and Aviall Services, Inc. Aviall discovered con-
tamination at the sites and notified the Texas Natural Resource Conser-
vation Commission ("TNRCC"), 3 which ordered Aviall to clean up the
site and threatened enforcement action. While neither the TNRCC nor
the U.S. EPA took formal judicial or administrative action to compel Avi-
all to take action, Aviall cleaned up the sites and filed suit in federal dis-
trict court seeking to recover its cleanup costs from Cooper. In its
amended complaint, Aviall alleged that it was entitled to seek contribu-
tion under section 113(f)(1) from Cooper as a potentially responsible
party ("PRP") under section 107(a). 4 The district court held that Aviall
was not entitled to relief under section 113(f)(1) because Aviall had not
been sued under section 106 or section 107.5 A divided panel of the Fifth
Circuit affirmed. 6 On rehearing en banc, however, a divided Fifth Circuit
reversed and held that PRPs can seek contribution under section
113(f)(1) whether or not the PRP has been sued under section 106 or
section 107. In a 7-2 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the en
banc Fifth Circuit and held that a private party not sued under CERCLA
section 1067 or section 107(a) 8 cannot obtain cost recovery under CER-
CLA section 113(f)(1). 9
The Court first considered the language of CERCLA section 113(f)(1):
"Any person may seek contribution ... during or following any civil ac-
tion under section 9606 of this title or under 9607(a) of this title .... "10
The Court pointed out that the natural meaning of the provision is that a
pre-existing civil action under CERCLA section 106 or section 107(a)
must exist before a party may bring an action for contribution.11 The
Court also noted that if section 113(f)(1) authorized suits at any time, the
explicit "during or following" language would be superfluous. 12 Simi-
larly, the Court noted that a separate contribution provision, section
113(f)(3)(B), would be superfluous if section 113(f)(1) authorized contri-
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75.
2. 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
3. In September 2002, the TNRCC changed its name to the Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality ("TCEQ").
4. Cooper, 543 U.S. at 164.
5. Id. at 164-65.
6. Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 263 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2001).
7. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606 (LexisNexis 2006).
8. Id. § 9607(a).
9. Id. § 9613(f)(1); Cooper, 543 U.S. at 159, 165.





bution actions at any time.13 The Court reasoned that "[t]here is no rea-
son why Congress would bother to specify conditions under which a
person may bring a contribution claim, and at the same time allow contri-
bution actions absent those conditions. '14
The Court also considered the limitations periods for contribution ac-
tions under CERCLA. 15 CERCLA provides corresponding three-year
limitations periods for contribution actions, one beginning at the date of
judgment16 for contribution claims brought under section 113(f)(1) and
one beginning at the date of settlement 17 for contribution claims brought
under section 113(f)(3)(B). 18 The lack of a limitations period for volun-
tary cleanups indicates that voluntary cleanups do not trigger a right to
contribution. 19
For these reasons, the court held that CERCLA section 113(f)(1) does
not support Aviall's suit.20 The savings clause of section 113(f)(1) did not
alter the Court's analysis; the court reasoned that the savings clause clari-
fied that section 113(f)(1) did not alter a party's right to contribution that
exists independently of section 113(f)(1). 21 The court explicitly declined
to rule on some other issues related to CERCLA contribution, including
whether Aviall was entitled to seek cost recovery under section
107(a)(4)(B) even though Aviall was a PRP;22 whether Aviall has an im-
plied right to contribution under section 107;23 and whether an adminis-
trative order under section 106 would qualify as a civil action under
section 106 or section 107 for purposes of seeking contribution under sec-
tion 113(f)(1). 24
Since the Aviall decision, these unanswered questions have been con-
sidered by other courts with inconsistent results. Some courts have found
a right of contribution under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B). 25 Other
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 167.
16. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(g)(3)(A) (LexisNexis 2006).
17. Id. § 9613(g)(3)(B).
18. See Cooper, 543 U.S. at 167.
19. See id.
20. Id. at 168.
21. Id.
22. Id. This issue was not fully explored after enactment of section 113 because courts
generally allowed PRPs to bring contribution actions under section 113, even in the ab-
sence of a civil action under section 106 or section 107.
23. Id. at 170-71. The Court, however, made a point to note other instances in which it
refused to recognize implied or common-law rights of contribution. Id.
24. Id. at 167-68, 168 n.5. One post-Aviall case has held that a CERCLA section 106
order is insufficient for a cause of action under CERCLA section 113(f)(3)(B). Pharmacia
Corp. v. Clayton Chem. Acquisition LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1086 (S.D. I11. 2005).
25. E.g., Vine Street LLC v. Keeling, 362 F. Supp. 2d 754, 764 (E.D. Tex. 2005), dis-
cussed infra; Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v. Lake River Corp., 365
F. Supp. 2d 913, 918 (N.D. I11. 2005). The Second Circuit has held that section 107(a)
allows a party that would be liable under section 107 but has not been sued or made to
participate in an administrative proceeding to recover necessary response costs incurred




courts have suggested that it may be difficult for PRPs to pursue actions
under section 107.26 In fact, on the remand of the Aviall case,2 7 there are
pending summary-judgment motions on the issue of whether Aviall has a
right to cost recovery under section 107.
On an administrative level, in response to the Aviall decision, the EPA
and some states have developed model language for use in administrative
orders and settlements to facilitate the use of section 113(f)(3)(B) by
those subject to the order or settlement.2 8 From the standpoint of PRPs
desiring to clean up properties and seek costs from other PRPs, reaching
a negotiated settlement with the EPA or a state to preserve a CERCLA
cause of action is a much more palatable option than asking the EPA or a
state to bring an action under CERCLA section 106 or section 107 or
simply abandoning a CERCLA cause of action altogether. To date, there
have been only a few post-Aviall cases discussing the adequacy of settle-
ment language or language in other documents to support a right to con-
tribution under CERCLA section 113(f)(3)(B).2 9
One of the questions left open by the Aviall decision arose in the East-
ern District of Texas in Vine Street LLC v. Keeling.30 In Vine Street, the
owner of a site that once had a dry cleaner sued a number of parties,
including The Dow Chemical Company, under CERCLA and state law
based on releases of perchloroethylene allegedly made and sold by Dow.
Dow filed a 12(b)(6) motion seeking, inter alia, dismissal of Vine Street's
CERCLA section 107(a) and section 113(f)(1) claims. The court, relying
on Aviall, reasoned that because Vine Street did not allege that it had
been sued under section 106 or section 107, or "otherwise been legally
compelled to incur... cleanup costs," Vine Street had no legal basis for a
contribution claim under section 113(f)(1) and accordingly dismissed
Vine Street's section 113(f)(1) claim.31
With respect to the section 107(a) claim, Dow argued that Vine Street
was barred from bringing the claim because Vine Street is a PRP. The
court, however, pointed out that "while most section 107(a) claims are
brought by innocent parties and most section 113(f) claims are brought by
potentially responsible parties, that does not mean potentially responsible
parties are barred from bringing claims under section 107(a). ' ' 32 The
26. E.g., Elementis Chems., Inc. v. TH Agric. & Nutrition, LLC, 373 F. Supp. 2d 257,
272 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
27. Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., No. Civ. A. 3-97-CV-1926-D, 2000 WL
31730 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2000) (not designated for publication).
28. E.g., Memorandum from Susan E. Bromm, U.S. E.P.A., and Bruce S. Gelber, U.S.
D.O.J., on Interim Revisions to CERCLA Removal, RI/FS and RD AOC Models to Clar-
ify Contribution Rights and Protection Under section 113(f) (Aug. 3, 2005), http://www.
epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/cleanup/superfund/interim-rev-aoc-mod-mem.pdf.
29. See, e.g., Con Edison Co., 423 F.3d at 95-96; W.R. Grace & Co. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc.,
No. 98-CV-838S(F), 2005 WL 1076117, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. May 3, 2005); Benderson Dev. Co.
v. Neumade Prods. Corp., No. 98-CV-0241SR, 2005 WL 1397013, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. June
13, 2005).
30. Vine St., 362 F. Supp. 2d at 760-64.
31. Id. at 761.
32. Id. at 762.
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court recognized that most courts have held that a PRP's claim falls
under section 113, not under section 107, but the court distinguished
those cases, stating that they considered the issue of whether a PRP with
a section 113(f) claim could concurrently bring a claim under section
107(a). 33 The court reasoned that a PRP is akin to a joint tortfeasor and
that section 107(a)(4)(B) "serves as the pre-enforcement analog to the
impleader contribution action permitted under section 9613(f)." 34 The
court concluded that a PRP that cannot bring a claim under section 113(f)
nevertheless has a claim under section 107(a). 35
2. Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act Claims
In R.R. Street & Co. v. Pilgrim Enterprises, Inc.,36 the Texas Supreme
Court outlined the scope of arranger liability under the Texas Solid Waste
Disposal Act ("TSWDA") 37 and provided guidance on a number of other
issues under the TSWDA. In Street, the owner of several dry-cleaning
facilities, Pilgrim, sought to recover costs incurred in addressing contami-
nation resulting from releases of the solvent perchloroethylene ("perc").
Pilgrim sued Street based on a Street employee's advice regarding dispo-
sal of separator water containing perc and the employee's disposal of test-
vial mixtures containing perc at the dry-cleaning facilities. The trial court
awarded Pilgrim $1.5 million, and Street appealed. The court of appeals
held that Street was liable under the TSWDA as an arranger based on
both the employee's advice and disposal actions.
In considering the scope of arranger liability under the TSWDA, the
court noted the lack of cases evaluating the issue. 38 In seeking guiding
authority, the court pointed out that the Texas Legislature chose language
very similar to CERCLA in defining arranger liability and accordingly
looked to federal case law for guidance in interpreting the TSWDA pro-
visions.39 The court stated that the federal courts generally agree that a
nexus between a party's conduct and disposal of a hazardous substance is
necessary to demonstrate arranger status and a totality of the circum-
stances approach is used to evaluate the nexus. 40 The court stated that
courts should consider whether a defendant: (1) owned or possessed the
solid waste in question; (2) had the authority to make disposal decisions;
(3) had the obligation to make disposal decisions; (4) exercised control
over decisions regarding the waste's disposal; or (5) actually disposed of
the solid waste.41 The court pointed out that no single factor is necessa-
33. Id. at 762.
34. Id. at 763 (quoting In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 993 F.2d 915, 931 (1st Cir.
1993)).
35. Id.
36. 166 S.W.3d 232 (Tex. 2005).
37. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 361.001-.754 (2005).
38. R.R. St. & Co., 166 S.W.3d at 241.
39. Id.





In reviewing Street's advice on disposal of separator water, the court
stated that it could not find any federal cases holding that providing tech-
nical services and advice resulted in arranger liability under CERCLA.43
The court concluded that Street did not physically dispose of the
separator water or have the authority to control disposal of the separator
water, and merely provided advice regarding disposal that Pilgrim was
free to ignore. Thus, the court concluded that no causal nexus had been
established between Street's conduct and the disposal of perc at Pilgrim's
sites.44
With respect to Street's disposal of test-vial mixtures containing perc,
the court first considered the question of whether the mixtures fell within
the definition of solid waste under the TSWDA. The court pointed out
that the definition of solid waste under the TSWDA is limited by the
domestic-sewage exclusion of RCRA.45 The court held that there was a
fact issue regarding whether the mixture fell within the domestic-sewage
exclusion of RCRA,46 so the court remanded this issue to the trial
court.
4 7
B. CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS FOR REMEDIATION COSTS
During the Survey period, several cases addressed contractual liability
for environmental claims. In one of the more significant cases, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on whether an agreement on the transfer
of certain natural-resource assets and liabilities of a former holding com-
pany to its former subsidiary included an indemnity for a refinery that
had been sold before the transfer of all assets.48 The company that subse-
quently purchased the refinery sued the former holding company under
CERCLA. While that suit was pending, the former holding company,
then known as Honeywell, sued the former subsidiary, then known as
Phillips Petroleum, for indemnification for the CERCLA suit. Phillips
argued that the refinery transfer occurred two years before the transfer of
the natural-resource assets, so the liability for the refinery was not as-
sumed, and it owed no indemnity obligation to Honeywell.
The operative language relating to the liabilities associated with the
assets was as follows:
The assets transferred under this Agreement are subject to all debts,
obligations and liabilities of Grantor of every kind and description
related to and/or arising out of or in connection with such assets, and
Grantee does hereby undertake, assume and agree to pay, perform
42. Id.
43. Id. at 244.
44. Id. at 246.
45. Id. at 247.
46. Id. at 249.
47. Id. at 255.




and discharge as they mature, accrue and/or become payable, all
such debts, obligations and liabilities. 49
A supplemental agreement provided that the former subsidiary assume
all of the debts, obligations, and liabilities, whether known or unknown,
related to the said natural-resources business and assets. It further stated
that the former subsidiary
hereby confirms to and agrees with [the former holding company]
that it has fully and unconditionally assumed and agreed to perform
and pay . . . all liabilities (known and unknown, accrued, absolute,
contingent, or otherwise) of any nature whatsoever, assigned to and
assumed ... by [the former subsidiary] pursuant to the ... Master
Agreement.50
The federal district court granted summary judgment to Phillips Petro-
leum, holding that it did not have any obligation to indemnify Honeywell.
The Fifth Circuit reviewed this decision de novo and agreed with the dis-
trict court that the Master Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement
did not require Phillips to indemnify Honeywell for the claimed losses,
concluding that the assumption of liabilities extended only to the liabili-
ties arising from the assets transferred, which did not include the refinery
because it had sold before the transfer to the subsidiary.
Honeywell argued that the intent was to transfer all of the subsidiary's
liabilities. The Fifth Circuit, however, ruled that such intent must be
found in the agreement's language. Honeywell further contended that
the agreement's language should be read to include the transfer of the
"business" of the former subsidiary and the liabilities associated with that
business, which would include the liabilities for the assets previously
transferred. The court ruled that this interpretation would require rewrit-
ing of the Master Agreement. As for the Supplemental Agreement, the
court determined that the references were to the business or assets trans-
ferred in the Master Agreement, so the underlying premise of assumption
of liability was not changed. 51
Honeywell argued that in a similar case in the Western District of New
York, the court had ruled that a subsidiary assumed all liabilities of the
division transferred to that subsidiary.52 The Fifth Circuit distinguished
that case in that the agreement transferred liability "relating to or arising
out of the Assets [transferred]. '53 "Assets" were defined as "[a]ll of the
assets, properties, business, good will, rights, privileges and interests of
whatever nature."' 54 In the Honeywell set of facts, the agreement focused
on the assets owned on the date of the transfer, whereas the liability in
the New York case focused on liabilities arising from the assets or busi-
49. Id. at 434.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 436.
52. Purolator Prods. Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 124, 133 (W.D.N.Y.
1991).




ness of the division transferred, irrespective of when those assets were
owned.
In another case involving a contractual claim for remediation costs, an
oil-field operator lost its claim to recover the cleanup costs of the release
of drilling fluids to the surrounding land against first the drilling contrac-
tor's insurance company and then against the drilling contractor. 55 This
case demonstrates the need to both understand and negotiate the appro-
priate environmental contract provisions and to understand and negotiate
the appropriate environmental insurance-coverage contract provisions.
In this case, the operator entered into a contract with the drilling con-
tractor that provided that the drilling contractor would provide certain
environmental insurance coverage. The contractor obtained the coverage
required, but, once a claim arose and the operator filed, the insurance
company denied the claim for reasons not entirely clear from the court's
decision. The operator then turned to the drilling contractor to seek re-
imbursement of its environmental-response costs. The drilling contractor
filed a declaratory-judgment action seeking a judgment that it did not
owe the operator for the environmental costs. The appellate court re-
versed the trial court's summary judgment for the operator and rendered
judgment for the contractor. 56
The appellate court's decision first reviewed an indemnity provision in
the contract. The indemnity contained two parts: first, the drilling con-
tractor was required to indemnify the operator for pollution claims that
originated above ground for specific types of releases; second, the opera-
tor was required to indemnify the drilling contractor for all other pollu-
tion or contamination claims. 57 The parties did not disagree that the
provision requiring the drilling contractor's indemnification covered the
pollution claims at issue.
The operator instead poorly argued that the drilling contractor was lia-
ble because the insurance company did not reimburse the operator since
the claim fell below the policy's deductible and the contract provided that
the drilling contractor was responsible for paying the deductible. How-
ever, the court ruled that the indemnity under the contract required the
operator to indemnify the drilling contractor for the particular claims,
notwithstanding any other contract provisions. 58 Thus, the court ruled
that the operator did not have a claim against the drilling contractor.
In a third contractual case, Finner v. Samson Resources Co., 59 a ranch
owner sued oil companies that had entered into a lease for a plant site
and leases for oil exploration and production. The main issue that the
appellate court reviewed was whether the oil-company lessees had
55. Helmrich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co. v. Swift Energy Co., 180 S.W.3d 635,637 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
56. Id. at 647.
57. Id. at 639.
58. Id. at 646-47.
59. No. 01-03-0049-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 7286, at *5 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] Aug. 31, 2005, pet. denied).
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breached either lease. The first question related to the legal interpreta-
tion of the contracts, and the second related to whether the evidence sup-
ported the jury's verdict that the leases were not breached.
The main obstacle that the plaintiffs faced was the wording of their
leases. The plant-site lease required the lessee "to generally restore the
surface of the land." 60 The problem was that the environmental contami-
nation was below ground from the operation of an old pit that had been
drained and buried. The oil-and-gas lease required the lessee to be "re-
sponsible for all damages to the surface of the lands. ' 61 The court con-
cluded that, since "surface" was not defined, its ordinary meaning was
properly construed as the soil's upper boundary. Thus, the lease provi-
sion did not cover subsurface damage or contamination.
In an attempt to avoid this conclusion, the plaintiffs argued that the
custom was for the lessee in these types of leases to be liable for
remediating land contamination. The court did not adopt this argument,
relying on the words in the contract to govern the lessee's duties rather
than alleged industry custom.
In reviewing the jury's verdict, the court concluded that the jury's deci-
sion would not be overturned since the damages were below the sur-
face.62 There was no basis to overturn their decision that the contract
had not been breached, and sufficient evidence supported the verdict.
C. ENVIRONMENTAL TORTS
1. Statute of Limitations
The issue of applying statute of limitations in environmental-tort suits
arose in several cases over the Survey period. First, in K-7 Enterprises,
L.P. v. Jeswood Oil Co, 63 the plaintiff landowner, K-7, brought suit
against an adjoining convenience store for damage to land based on mi-
gration of gasoline chemicals that were released from underground stor-
age tanks located on property across the street. Five years earlier, K-7
learned of contamination on its property and the defendants' insurer
agreed to remediate K-7's property. Later, K-7 learned that subsequent
leaks had continued to sporadically migrate onto its property. Since the
property had not been remediated and more releases of fuel had oc-
curred, K-7 sued; however, the trial court granted summary judgment
based on the statute of limitations.64
On appeal, the appellate court first pointed out that the accrual date in
such cases depends on whether the injury is permanent or temporary-an
action for permanent damage accrues on discovery of the first actionable
injury, while an action for temporary damage continues to accrue with
60. Id. at *9.
61. Id. at *15.
62. Id. at *29.
63. No. 2-03-312-CV, 2005 WL 182947, at *1 (Tex. App-Fort Worth Jan. 27, 2005, no
pet.) (not designated for publication).
64. Id. at *2.
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each injury-and damages may be recovered for injuries sustained within
the two years before filing suit.65 The appellate court ruled that K-7's
summary-judgment evidence indicated multiple tank leaks on distinct oc-
casions and sporadic migration onto K-7's property. Thus, the defendants
failed to conclusively establish that the injuries to K-7's land were perma-
nent. 66 Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment with respect to injuries to K-7's property occurring on
or after January 15, 2001.67
With respect to damages occurring before that date, K-7 argued that
summary judgment was improper because the defendants should be pre-
vented from asserting a limitations defense based on the doctrines of eq-
uitable estoppel or fraudulent concealment, 68 since K-7 relied on the
affirmative representations of the defendants' insurer and environmental
consultant regarding the contamination and remediation of K-7's prop-
erty. The court questioned whether the defendants' consultant, a non-
party, was under a duty to disclose information to K-7 and concluded that
there was a lack of evidence regarding deception by the defendants them-
selves. Thus, the court held that K-7's reliance on the consultant's and
insurance company's representations was unreasonable, and equitable es-
toppel and fraudulent concealment were not applicable. 69
2. Causation Issues
Causation was essentially the main issue in Quemado Plaintiffs v. Ex-
xon Mobil Corp.,70 a case in which the plaintiffs sued oil companies, al-
leging that leaks from the defendants' underground storage tanks
polluted the water supply, caused personal injuries, and devalued the
plaintiffs' property. The plaintiffs further claimed that the defendants
were liable for inadequate remediation activities. The trial court granted
the defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to the various
tort claims, holding that the plaintiffs presented no evidence that the de-
fendants owned, operated, or controlled the storage tanks at the time of
the gasoline leaks. The appellate court found that the defendants had
transferred ownership of the gasoline service stations at issue five to
seven years before the first reported leak in the underground tanks, and
that no evidence was presented that the defendants had knowledge of
leaks at the time of their ownership transfer. The court also held that the
defendants' display of brand signs on the premises did not equate to con-
trol of the premises.
In another case involving a causation question, the defendant landown-
ers placed several truckloads of manure on their family farm, which the
65. Id. at *3.
66. Id.
67. Id. at *7.
68. Id. at *5.
69. Id. at *6.




plaintiffs claimed polluted their water well.71 The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants for the claims based on the
theory of res ipsa loquitor, because the plaintiffs had not presented any
evidence that groundwater contamination ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of negligence under the facts and circumstances described by the
plaintiffs. Moreover, the plaintiffs failed to present any evidence that
their groundwater was contaminated by the manure on the defendants'
farm. Finally, the court held that the plaintiffs' allegations that their
groundwater would eventually become contaminated by the manure per-
colating through the soil did not state a current condition and thus did not
support a current nuisance or nuisance per se cause of action.
3. Negligence Per Se
In Mieth v. Ranchquest, Inc.,72 the property owners sued oil-and-gas-
lease owners to recover damages caused to the surface estate by the al-
leged negligent operation of an oil-and-gas well. One of the most signifi-
cant issues on appeal was whether the trial court erred by refusing to
submit a jury instruction on negligence per se because the lease owners
violated a Railroad Commission rule prohibiting the pollution of surface
water.73 This rule provides that "no person conducting activities subject
to regulation by the commission may cause or allow pollution of surface
or subsurface water in the state."'74 The court first explained that for an
administrative rule to be a standard for negligence, a purpose of the rule
must be to protect the class of persons to which the injured party belongs
from the hazard involved in the particular case.75 The court held that the
rule "clearly affords protection to the class of persons to which appellants
belong, i.e., surface owners, against the hazard involved, i.e., pollution of
surface and subsurface water. '76
4. Measure of Damages for Injuries to Land
The measure of damages for injuries to land in environmental tort
cases was reviewed by the Eastland Court of Appeals in a case brought
by a ranch owner against an oil company for surface damages to prop-
erty.77 In a second trial on only the oil company's liability, the jury de-
cided that the oil company was liable for $2,110,000 in actual damages for
the cleanup costs and diminution in value, $880,000 in prejudgment inter-
est, and $86,000 in punitive damages. The oil company challenged,
among other things, the evidence for the jury's verdict on cleanup costs
71. Aguilar v. Trujillo, 162 S.W.3d 839, 844 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2005, pet. denied).
72. 177 S.W.3d 296, 300 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
73. Id. at 305.
74. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8(b) (2006).
75. Mieth, 177 S.W.3d at 305 (citing Cont'l Oil Co. v. Simpson, 604 S.W.2d 530, 534
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
76. Id.





The appellate court considered the measure of damages for surface
owners' claims for damages to land, recognizing that the type of compen-
sation depends on the type of injury.79 In applying another Eastland
Court of Appeals case, it decided that the cost to restore the land was not
reasonable, such that it could not be considered in the analysis of dam-
ages.80 Thus, the court ruled that the measure of damages would be the
diminution in market value regardless of whether the injury was tempo-
rary or permanent. 81 However, it was not clear how the diminution in
value was to be determined.8 2
5. Standing to Sue for Injury to Land
In two cases, courts reviewed claims by landowners for injuries to land
that occurred before the landowners purchased the property. In West v.
Brenntag Southwest, Inc.,83 the court ruled that for a landowner to have
standing to sue for injury to land, one of two circumstance must exist: (1)
if the injury occurred before the current landowner's purchase, the seller
must have assigned the claim to the current landowner; or (2) the injury
to the land must have occurred during the plaintiff's ownership of the
land. Because there was no assignment of claims, the court had to deter-
mine whether there was evidence of a new and distinct injury that oc-
curred after the plaintiff acquired the property. The plaintiff argued that
the contamination's gradual leaking into the soil continued while he
owned the property and that this fact was sufficient to show a new injury
to support standing. The court disagreed, holding that the fact that the
injury existed throughout the plaintiff's ownership did not create a new
injury to the land. The court found that the injury was continuous and
lingering and, without an assignment, would not support standing to bring
suit for negligence or nuisance.
In another case, landowners sought damages for oil-field operations, in
part occurring before they purchased the property. 84 The appellate court
upheld a plea to the jurisdiction, ruling that the plaintiffs did not have
standing to seek damages that were caused before they purchased the
property because the claims were not transferred to them as part of the
transaction. 85 However, the court ruled that the trial court erred in grant-
ing the plea to the jurisdiction to those claims for discharges of hydrocar-
bons and damages to plaintiff's farm equipment that allegedly occurred
after the purchase of the property.86 The plaintiffs also failed to assert a
78. Id.
79. Id. at 261.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 263-64.
83. 168 S.W.3d 327, 332-33 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, pet. denied).
84. Denman v. SND Operating, L.L.C., No. 06-04-00061-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS
7795, at *6 (Tex. App.-Texarkana Sept. 23, 2005, no pet.).
85. Id. at *14-15.
86. Id. at *19.
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cause of action under section 85.321 of the Texas Natural Resources
Code. 87 Finally, the court ruled that the plaintiffs could not bring a claim
under the Texas Litter Abatement Act 88 for solid waste arising from oil-
and-gas operations. 89
D. PREEMPTION
1. CERCLA Preemption of State Statute of Repose
In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Poole Chemical
Co.,90 the Fifth Circuit held that section 9658 of CERCLA does not pre-
empt the Texas statute of repose regarding a buyer's product-liability
claims. Appellee argued that section 9658 preempted the statute of re-
pose by superimposing the discovery rule on the running of the statute's
period of repose. The court found that section 9658 did engraft a discov-
ery rule on state statutes of limitation, but not on statutes of repose.
Under the plain meaning of section 9658, the court held that section 9658
preempts state law when the applicable statute of limitations provides a
commencement date that is earlier than the federally required com-
mencement date, but does not preempt the statute of repose.91
2. FIFRA Preemption
In Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,9 2 the United States Supreme Court
considered whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act ("FIFRA") 93 preempted certain common-law claims and claims
under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.94 The petitioners in the
case were 29 Texas peanut farmers who alleged that their crops were
damaged by the application of a Dow pesticide named "Strongarm. ' 95
The farmers' claims included breach of express warranty, fraud, violation
of the DTPA, strict liability, negligent testing, and negligent failure to
warn.
The Supreme Court held that the term "requirements" in section
136v(b) of FIFRA applied to both statutes and regulations and to com-
mon-law duties.96 Thus, FIFRA could preempt state common law. How-
ever, the Court noted that the fact that FIFRA could preempt common
law said nothing about the scope of the preemption. The Court then pro-
vided a two-part test for determining the scope of preemption. First, the
state rule "must be a requirement 'for labeling and packaging'; rules gov-
87. Id. at *22.
88. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 365.012(a) (2005).
89. Denman, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 7795, at *28.
90. 419 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2005).
91. Id. at 361-65.
92. 544 U.S. 431 (2005).
93. 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. (2000).
94. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.01 et seq. (2002).
95. Bates, 544 U.S. at 434.
96. Id. at 443.
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erning the design of a product, for example, are not pre-empted. ''97 Sec-
ond, the state rule "must impose a labeling or packaging requirement that
is 'in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter.'
A state regulation requiring the word 'poison' to appear in red letters, for
instance, would not be pre-empted if an EPA regulation imposed the
same requirement." 98 Applying this test, the Court found that most of
the farmers' claims for defective design, defective manufacture, negligent
testing, and breach of express warranty were not preempted because they
did not relate to "labeling or packaging." 99 However, the Court noted
that the farmers' fraud and negligent-failure-to-warn claims were based
on common-law rules that qualify as "requirements for labeling or pack-
aging,"' ° and satisfied the first prong of the test; thereby, they were pre-
empted by FIFRA. The Court concluded that the question of whether
the farmers' fraud and failure-to-warn claims must be remanded to the
appellate court to decide whether these claims violated the test's second
prong and were preempted.10 1
III. WASTEWATER ISSUES
A. APPLICABILITY OF THE NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGED
ELIMINATION SYSTEM TO OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS
The Fifth Circuit in Texas Independent Producers and Royalty Owners
Ass'n v. United States EPA10 2 determined that pre-enforcement review of
an EPA rule deferring NPDES storm-water requirements for certain oil-
and-gas construction sites was not proper. Shortly after this case was
handed down, Congress addressed this issue in legislation that prohibited
the EPA from exercising jurisdiction to issue storm-water permits for
most oil-and-gas operations. As part of the 1987 Clean Water Act
Amendments, Congress generally required regulation of storm-water dis-
charges, but expressly prohibited the EPA from requiring a permit for
storm-water discharges from oil-and-gas exploration and production un-
less the discharges were contaminated with materials on the site.103
When the EPA issued its Phase II storm-water rules, extending the
NPDES permit program to operators of construction sites disturbing
more than one acre of land, the EPA assumed that few oil-and-gas opera-
tions would be affected by the Phase II rules.104
The EPA later learned that thousands of oil-and-gas sites could be af-
fected and responded by deferring applicability of the Phase II rules to
small oil-and-gas construction activities to June 12, 2006.105 The Texas
97. Id. (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b)) (emphasis in original).
98. Id. (emphasis in original).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 457.
102. 413 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2005).
103. Clean Water Act § 402(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(1) (2005).
104. Texas Independent, 413 F.3d at 481.
105. Id. at 481-82.
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Independent Producers and Royalty Owners Association petitioned the
Fifth Circuit for review asserting that, in the deferral rule, the EPA inter-
preted the Phase II rules to apply to construction activities associated
with oil-and-gas activities, which was inconsistent with the Clean Water
Act.10 6 The court analyzed the challenge under the ripeness test and
evaluated whether delayed review would cause hardship, whether judicial
intervention would inappropriately interfere with administrative action,
and whether the courts would benefit from additional factual develop-
ment. 10 7 The court was unconvinced that there would be hardship to the
petitioner, given that the only changes to the rule would not become ef-
fective for approximately one year. The court was also uncomfortable
cutting off the EPA's interpretive process in light of the fact that the EPA
specifically stated its intention to examine how to resolve issues posed by
section 401(l)(2) of the Clean Water Act.10 8 Finally, the court stated that
it would benefit from further factual development, especially because the
EPA had not determined the scope of construction related to oil-and-gas
development subject to the Phase II rules.10 9 In summary, the court
stated that "it is uncertain whether EPA will require permits from Peti-
tioners and there is no immediacy to the requirements as they do not go
into effect for a year.""10
Shortly after the case was decided, Congress settled the issue with the
passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005.111 In section 323 of the Act,
Congress defined "oil and gas exploration and production" to include "all
field activities . . . whether or not such field activities or operations may
be considered . . . construction activities."' 12 As a result of the Act, on
January 6, 2006, the EPA proposed a rule to clarify that activities associ-
ated with oil-and-gas exploration, production, processing, or treatment
operations, or transmission facilities are exempt from NPDES storm-
water permit requirements.' 13 The EPA interprets the "statutory exemp-
tion to include construction of drilling sites, drilling waste management
pits, and access roads as well as construction of the transportation and
treatment infrastructure such as pipelines, natural gas treatment plants,
natural gas compressor stations and crude oil pumping stations." 14 Fur-
ther, the proposed rule is applicable to all States, federal lands, and In-
dian Country regardless of the permitting authority." 5 States remain
free, however, to regulate discharges under state law. 116
106. Id. at 482.
107. Id. at 482-83.
108. Id. at 483.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 483-84.
111. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
112. Id. § 323 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(24) (2005)).
113. 71 Fed. Reg. 894 (Jan. 6, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122).
114. Id. at 897.




B. CWA STANDING AND NOTICE
In a case involving justiciability issues, Environmental Conservation
Organization v. City of Dallas, the federal District Court for the Northern
District of Texas considered when a party has standing to bring a citizen-
enforcement action under the Clean Water Act and the notice require-
ments required to bring such an action. 1 7 In considering the capacity of
an organization or association to sue in a representative capacity, the
court required proof of three elements: (1) that one or more of the organ-
ization's members would have standing to sue individually; (2) that the
organization is seeking to protect interests germane to its purpose; and
(3) that neither the claim asserted nor the relief sought requires the mem-
bers to participate in the lawsuit.' 18 Regarding the first element, the
court concluded that the Fifth Circuit has adopted an "indicia of member-
ship" test to determine whether an organization has members whose in-
terests it can represent in court. The Fifth Circuit had previously
concluded that factors to consider in determining indicia of membership
include: (1) whether the members elect the organization's governing body
and support the organization financially; (2) whether the members volun-
tarily associate with the organization; (3) whether the organization has a
clearly articulated and understood membership structure; and (4)
whether the suit is within the organization's central purpose. 119 If the
organization is sufficiently identified with and subject to the influence of
its members, it will have associational standing. 120
A question also arose at to whether the plaintiff association could es-
tablish that any of the members of ECO suffered an injury traceable to
alleged violations by the City or that any injury would be redressed by a
favorable decision. At the summary-judgment stage, affidavit testimony
from a water-pollution-control engineer describing the water flow from
the Dallas discharge point to certain waterways including White Rock
Creek, Turtle Creek, and Cedar Creek, and affidavit testimony from a
member of the association describing how her visits to Turtle Creek,
White Rock Lake, and the Trinity River have been impacted by odors,
trash, and debris was sufficient to demonstrate an injury-in-fact fairly
traceable to the City's conduct. 121
Regarding notice, the court held that a letter specifically describing cer-
tain alleged violations, the corresponding sections of the permit allegedly
violated, and the date of the alleged violations satisfied the statutory no-
tice requirements of the Clean Water Act;122 thus, the court denied sum-
mary judgment. On the other hand, the court held that "[t]he allegation
that the City is 'discharging pollutant-laden storm water and non-storm
117. No. 3-03-V-2951-BD, 2005 WL 1771289 (N.D. Tex. July 26, 2005).
118. Id. at *2.
119. Id. (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Chevron Chemical Co., 129 F.3d 826, 829
(5th Cir. 1997)).
120. See id. at *2-3.
121. Id. at *34.
122. Id. at *6.
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water without a NPDES or TPDES permit, in violation of a NPDES or
TPDES permit, and/or at levels far exceeding any discharge permitted
under a NPDES or TPDES permit, is far too broad to give meaningful
notice of ECO's complaint." 123 Failure to identify the pollutants alleg-
edly discharged or the dates of the alleged discharges effectively deprived
the City of the opportunity to correct the alleged problems. 124 Accord-
ingly, the court dismissed those claims.' 2 5
C. WETLAND DREDGE AND FILL PERMITS
During the Survey period, the Fifth Circuit provided further guidance
on the U.S. Supreme Court's wetlands jurisdictional case, known as
SWANCC. 126 The SWANCC case provided the Court's views on the
scope of jurisdictional wetlands under section 404 of the federal Clean
Water Act ("CWA"). 127 In City of Shoreacres v. Waterworth, plaintiffs
brought an action challenging the Army Corps of Engineers' issuance of a
dredge-and-fill permit under section 404 of the CWA because the Corps
declared that only 19.7 acres of a 146-acre tract were jurisdictional wet-
lands. 128 The plaintiffs claimed that the Corps had corrupted the entire
decisional process by undercounting the wetlands' acreage within its juris-
diction for a new cargo- and cruise-ship terminal for the Port Authority
on undeveloped land in Harris County. 129
Before the Court's decision in SWANCC, the Corps had determined
that there were 102 acres of jurisdictional wetlands at the site.130 How-
ever, in SWANCC, the Court limited the Corps' jurisdiction to regulate
wetlands. 131 After the SWANCC decision, the Corps reevaluated its ju-
risdiction and determined that "in this setting, the overland sheet flow
was as a factual, scientific matter inadequate to establish a sufficient hy-
drological nexus with interstate waters" to establish jurisdiction, and,
thus, the Corps reduced the area to which its jurisdiction extended to only
19.7 acres of wetlands. 132 This decision provides valuable guidance to the
regulated community that, if the only hydrological connection with inter-
state waters is overland sheet flow, that sheet flow may not suffice to
bring wetlands under the Corps' jurisdiction.
Because the mitigation provided by the Port Authority was so substan-
tial, involving over 1,130 acres of wetlands and other habitat, the court
found no abuse of discretion given that the Corps would have made the




126. Solid Waste Agency at N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S.
159 (2001).
127. Id.
128. 420 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2005).
129. Id. at 446, 444.
130. Id. at 446.
131. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 160.




The plaintiffs also challenged the Corps' issuance of the wetlands
dredge-and-fill permit on grounds that the Corps failed to consider prac-
ticable alternatives that would have less environmental impact as re-
quired by the Clean Water Act guidelines.134 The plaintiffs specifically
complained that the Corps failed to consider two sites in southwest Gal-
veston Bay at Pelican Island and Shoal Point.135 The court rejected the
plaintiff's claims that these sites were "practicable" under the test set
forth in the Clean Water Act guidelines, section 230.19(a)(2) because
Shoal Point is outside the condemnation power of the Port and was not
"available" in that the Corps had recently issued a permit to Texas City to
build a cargo- and cruise-ship terminal at that site. 136 Further, the court
found neither site to be a logistically feasible alternative and, therefore,
not "practicable" because the Port could not legally spend the proceeds
from the Harris County bonds, which are intended to fund the project,
outside of Harris County, and both of the alternative sites were outside
Harris County.' 37
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' contentions that the decision ran
afoul of section 230.10(c) of the guidelines, prohibiting significant degra-
dation of U.S. waters, because the Port failed to consider the adverse ef-
fect that would flow from the eventual deepening of the Houston Ship
Channel, which would increase the salinity of Galveston Bay's freshwater
ecosystems.1 38 The court was not convinced by this argument, finding
that the regulatory provision requires consideration of the adverse effect
on the cumulative impact of the discharges of dredged or fill material,
and concluding that any future deepening of the Houston Ship Channel
would not result from the project. 139
In a related state court challenge of the State agency's action relating to
these particular wetlands, City of Shoreacres v. Texas Commission on En-
vironmental Quality,140 the Port of Houston obtained a federal section
404 dredge-and-fill permit and began construction of a containerized
cargo- and cruise-ship terminal. TCEQ had previously issued a water-
quality certification in connection with the project. The plaintiffs sought
judicial review of the administrative decision, which was lost at the dis-
trict court level, before the Austin Court of Appeals. 141 The appellate
court concluded that the Port was not required to obtain state authoriza-
tion for the project independent of the federal dredge-and-fill permit is-
sued by the Corps.1 42
133. Id. at 447.
134. Id. at 447-48; see 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (2005).
135. Waterworth, 420 F.3d at 448.
136. Id.; see 40 C.F.R. § 230.19(a)(2) (2005).
137. Waterworth, 420 F.3d at 448.
138. Id. at 449; see 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c).
139. Waterworth, 420 F.3d at 449.
140. 166 S.W.3d 825 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, no pet.).
141. Id. at 829-30.
142. Id. at 839.
1296 [Vol. 59
Environmental Law
The court found that under the state statutory scheme, no separate
state authorization was required for the issuance of a section 404 dredge-
and-fill permit. While the State cannot issue its own dredge-and-fill per-
mit, the court found that the State had veto power over the issuance of
the federal dredge-and-fill permit because the State must decide whether
to issue a certificate if there is reasonable assurance that the activity will
meet state water-quality standards. The federal permit will not issue if
the State denies certification. 143 However, once the federal permit has
been issued, the court ruled that the project will proceed under the au-
thority of that permit, and not the state-issued water-quality certifica-
tion.144 The city's arguments that independent state action was necessary
in addition to the federal permit became moot once the federal permit
was issued.145 The court further held that an exception to the mootness
doctrine did not apply in this case because the "dispute was not of such
short duration that the cities could not have obtained review before the
issue became moot. 146
IV. ENDANGERED SPECIES AND WILDLIFE PROTECTION
A. DENIAL OF PETITION TO LIST AN ENDANGERED SPECIES
In Save Our Springs Alliance v. Norton,14 7 the Save Our Springs Alli-
ance ("SOSA") sued the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, alleging
the Fish and Wildlife Service violated the "regular listing" and "emer-
gency listing" provisions of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). SOSA
filed a July 7, 2003 petition to add species of the karst invertebrate to the
endangered-species list. The species at issue was a species of spider found
only in two caves in Travis County. 148
The ESA outlines the process that the Fish and Wildlife Service must
follow when handling such petitions. 149 To "the maximum extent practi-
cable," the Fish and Wildlife Service must make a finding within ninety
days as to whether the petition presents "information indicating that the
petitioned action may be warranted." 150 If the petition presents such in-
formation, then the Fish and Wildlife Service shall promptly review the
status of the species concerned, and it must issue findings stating that the
petition is warranted, not warranted, or is warranted but precluded by
another factor within twelve months. 15 ' This procedure may be circum-
vented to list a species on an emergency basis. 152
143. See id. at 834.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 838.
146. Id. at 839.
147. 361 F. Supp. 2d 643 (W.D. Tex. 2005). The "regular listing" and "emergency list-
ing" provisions of the ESA are codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3), (b)(7) (2000).
148. Norton, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 645.
149. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2005).
150. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(A).
151. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(A)-(B).
152. See id. § 1533(b)(7).
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The court divided its analysis of the case between SOSA's emergency-
listing claim and its regular-listing claim. The court found SOSA's emer-
gency-listing claim to be moot, because eight months after the suit was
filed, the Fish and Wildlife Service issued its ninety-day finding that emer-
gency listing was not warranted. 153 With respect to its claim that the spe-
cies should be listed under the regular-listing process, SOSA alleged that
the Fish and Wildlife Service violated the ESA by issuing its ninety-day
finding after ninety days, and by completely failing to issue the twelve-
month finding.
The court first found that because the Fish and Wildlife Service had
issued the ninety-day finding, that issue was moot, even though the find-
ing was issued late.154 The sole remaining issue was whether the Fish and
Wildlife Service should be required to issue the twelve-month finding.
The Fish and Wildlife Service argued that it could issue that finding by
December 8, 2005, and that the delay in issuing the finding was due to
budget constraints.155 The court found this timetable reasonable and
granted summary judgment in favor of the Fish and Wildlife Service-
thereby establishing a new deadline for the twelve-month finding.156 On
December 19, 2005, the Fish and Wildlife Service issued its twelve-month
finding, which concluded that listing the spider was not warranted. 157
V. SOLID WASTE
In a low-key end to a long-running, high-profile challenge of the Sierra
Club and Downwinders at Risk to the burning of hazardous waste fuels in
TXI's cement plant in Midlothian, Texas, the Austin Court of Appeals
upheld the dismissal for want of prosecution of the groups' challenge to
TCEQ's issuance of the solid-waste permit. 158 This latest round began in
June 1999, when the environmental groups timely filed a challenge to
TCEQ's permit.159 The district court dismissed the case for want of juris-
diction. The Austin Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal, and the
Texas Supreme Court affirmed that decision. 160 On May 28, 2002 the
supreme court remanded the cause.' 6 ' Five months later, TXI filed a pe-
tition in intervention and a plea to the jurisdiction. One month later,
appellants filed a motion to strike TXI's intervention and a response to
the jurisdictional plea. 162 TCEQ promptly filed motion to dismiss the
case for want of prosecution.
On January 7, 2004, the court granted TCEQ's motion and dismissed
153. Norton, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 647-48.
154. Id. at 648.
155. Id. at 648-49.
156. Id. at 649.
157. See 70 Fed. Reg. 75071 (Dec. 19, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
158. Sierra Club v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, 188 S.W.3d 220, 221 (Tex. App.-







the case for want of prosecution. 163 The Sierra Club promptly filed an
unverified motion to reconsider the order of dismissal, which the court
denied after a hearing on the motion on January 9. Forty-eight days later,
the Sierra Club filed a notice of appeal.164 The court of appeals held that
the notice of appeal was untimely because the Sierra Club failed to file a
verified motion to reconsider the order of dismissal, which would have
extended the time for filing the notice of appeal to ninety days.165 The
court rejected Sierra Club's argument that that the motion to reconsider
was not a motion to reinstate that must be verified, finding that a motion
to reinstate is the only remedy available to a party whose case is dis-
missed for want of prosecution. 166 Thus, the court concluded that it
lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.
A. LANDFILL PERMIT AMENDMENT
In Citizens Against Landfill Location v. Texas Commission on Environ-
mental Quality, 67 a citizens' group challenged the TCEQ decision to
amend a solid-waste-landfill permit to allow for a vertical expansion of a
landfill in Hidalgo County. On appeal of TCEQ's decision to allow the
expansion, a Travis County district court rejected the citizen-group's chal-
lenge that TCEQ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
The district court upheld TCEQ's decision, which the citizens appealed to
the Austin Court of Appeals. 16 8
The citizens first asserted that the portion of TCEQ's order approving
the establishment and maintenance of final cover was not supported by
substantial evidence. The approved final cover design called for an ero-
sion layer of at least twelve inches of soil and a financial-assurance bond.
The court found that "[a]lthough the record contains evidence suggesting
that more than twelve inches of soil may be necessary to successfully es-
tablish and maintain vegetative growth on the final cover, TCEQ's con-
clusion is supported by substantial evidence. ' 169 The court went on to
state that even if the citizens had shown that the evidence "preponderates
against TCEQ's finding," the fact that the record contained more than a
scintilla of evidence supporting TCEQ's finding would meet the substan-
tial-evidence test. 170 Applying this deferential standard to the citizens'
other claims, the court found that TCEQ's decisions with respect to cost
estimates for financial assurance, surface-water drainage, groundwater
monitoring, and administrative completeness of the application were all





167. 169 S.W.3d 258 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet. denied).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 266.
170. Id. at 267.
171. See id. at 267-71.
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In addition to considering issues of substantial evidence, in another
case, the court clarified the scope of its holding in BFI Waste Systems of
North America v. Martinez Environmental Group.172 In BFI, the court
held that an applicant's mere recitation of statutory requirements was in-
sufficient to satisfy the applicant's burden of proving that it met each reg-
ulatory requirement.1 73 In Citizens Against Landfill Location, the court
concluded that the rules provided specific requirements on certain issues,
and the record reflected how these requirements would be met; thus, suf-
ficient evidence existed to approve this aspect of the permit expansion.174
The other significant issue considered in the case was whether TCEQ
could consider the provisions of a civil settlement agreement between the
applicant and a third party in its decision on the permit application.
Before applying for the permit expansion, the applicant entered into a
settlement agreement that specified a standard for storm-water-runoff
features at the facility. TCEQ's order required less stringent storm-water
standards than the settlement agreement. The citizens argued that
TCEQ's failure to enforce the higher standard in the settlement agree-
ment was error.1 75 The court agreed with the ALJs, who concluded that
the "[e]nforcement of the settlement agreement is more appropriately
left to the civil court system that generated it.'176
B. CHALLENGE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PERMIT=ING DECISIONS
1. Saltwater-Disposal Wells
In Grimes v. State,177 Grimes sought review of a judgment from the
District Court of Travis County that affirmed a Texas Railroad Commis-
sion order granting a permit to Endeavor Energy Resources, L.P. to op-
erate a saltwater-disposal well under Texas Water Code section
27.051(b). 178 In its administrative review of the application, the Commis-
sion found that the disposal operations would not endanger the natural
energy resources or cause pollution of the freshwater stratum, provided
operations were conducted under the pressure and volume conditions
specified in the permit.179
Grimes challenged the permit on the grounds that the Railroad Com-
mission's decision was not supported by substantial evidence and was ar-
bitrary and capricious. In its opinion, the Austin Court of Appeals first
determined that there was substantial evidence to support the Commis-
sion's order, that is, reasonable minds could have concluded that the pro-
172. 93 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied).
173. See id. at 580.
174. Citizens, 169 S.W.3d at 268-69.
175. Id. at 273.
176. Id.
177. No. 03-04-00154-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 6963 (Tex. App.-Austin Aug. 26,
2005, no pet.).
178. Id. at *1-2.
179. Id. at *3.
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posed disposal well was sufficient to protect groundwater.180 Second, the
court held that an agency's decision generally is not arbitrary or capri-
cious if it is supported by substantial evidence, but "instances may arise in
which an agency's decision supported by substantial evidence, but is arbi-
trary and capricious nonetheless."' 181 "An agency abuses its discretion in
reaching a decision if it omits from its consideration factors that the legis-
lature intended the agency to consider, includes in its consideration irrel-
evant factors, or reaches a completely unreasonable result after weighing
only relevant factors."'1 82 The court concluded that granting the operat-
ing permit would result in conserving some natural resources, a matter
within the statutory authority of the Railroad Commission, and it was
therefore not arbitrary and capricious. 183 The court also rejected Grimes'
arguments that the Railroad Commission did not consider Endeavor's
compliance history and that the permit allowed disposal on adjacent
property in which Endeavor had no real-property interest. 184
VI. LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
The Austin Court of Appeals considered imposing liability on a former
officer and director for violation of an agreed order by a corporation,
L&HP, in Lacey v. State.185 In Lacey, L&HP entered into an agreed or-
der in November 1995 with the State of Texas regarding some under-
ground storage tanks maintained by L&HP. In November 1996, the State
filed suit alleging non-compliance with the agreed order. The State
sought damages from the company and from its officers and directors
individually based on the failure to file annual public-information re-
ports. 186 To identify the officers and directors, the State used the last
report filed by L&HP in 1992, which listed H.A. Lacey among the officers
and directors. The trial court granted summary judgment against Lacey,
and he appealed. 187
In his appeal, Lacey asserted summary judgment was improper because
he raised a fact issue regarding whether he was an officer and director of
L&HP after December 1993.188 Lacey introduced affidavit evidence that
he resigned as an officer and director in December 1993, moved to North
Carolina, and had no further contact with the corporation. 189 The court
180. Id. at *5-6, *8.
181. Id. at *9.
182. Id. at *10.
183. Id. at *12.
184. Id. at *12-13.
185. No. 03-02-00601-CV, 2005 WL 2312485 (Tex. App.-Austin Sept. 21, 2005, no pet.)
(not designated for publication).
186. Under Texas Tax Code section 171.203, Texas corporations are required to file
annual public-information reports, and under section 171.255(a), failure to file the report
forfeits corporate privileges and subjects the directors and officers to individual liability for
the corporate debts incurred after the date the report is due, TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 171.203 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
187. Lacey, 2005 WL 2312485, at *1.
188. Id.
189. Id. at *2.
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noted that the Tax Code does not require that changes to the public-in-
formation report be made immediately, and no presumption of continuity
of officers is raised if later reports are not filed. 190 Further, the court
pointed out that the 1992 report expired three years before L&HP vio-
lated the agreed order. Based on this information, the court held that the
State had not conclusively established that Lacey was an officer or direc-
tor of L&HP when the violations occurred and, accordingly, reversed the
district court's summary judgment.191
VII. CRIMINAL CASES
In two cases, criminal convictions under the Texas Water Code were
appealed. In Griffin Industries, Inc. v. State, the Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals held that a Texas Water Code provision prohibiting discharge of
waste or pollutants into the state waters was not unconstitutionally vague
as applied. 192 A jury convicted the defendant of unauthorized discharge
under section 7.147 of the Texas Water Code after chicken waste spilled
from Griffin's truck onto the street and into the storm drain.1 93 Griffin
argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it fails to provide
notice of what conduct is prohibited and leaves the determination of what
constitutes an offense to the discretion of law-enforcement agencies of
the State. 194 Applying the general rule that a statute is void for vague-
ness if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
or her contemplated conduct is forbidden by statute or if it encourages
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions, the court rejected Griffin's
argument that the phrase "to discharge" as defined by the Code failed to
give fair notice.195 Finally, the court held that there was sufficient evi-
dence to support Griffin's conviction and that the court did not commit
reversible error in refusing Griffin's request for a jury instruction on
causation. 196
In the second case, Copeland v. State,197 the El Paso Court of Appeals
held that there was insufficient evidence to support the appellant's con-
viction for the offense of intentional or knowing unauthorized dis-
charge. 198 The primary evidence in the case was a video tape showing the
trailer-park owner setting up a pump at the trailer park's cesspool. The
tape showed the appellant approach the pump, pick up a tool near the
pump, and leave. He then pumped the contents of the cesspool onto the
ground.1 99 The court held that "[w]hile there might have been knowledge
190. Id.
191. Id. at *3.
192. 171 S.W.3d 414 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, pet. ref'd).
193. Id. at 416.
194. Id. at 417.
195. Id. at 417-19.
196. Id. at 419-21.
197. No. 08-02-00505-CR, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 9836 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso Nov. 4,
2004, no pet.).
198. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 7.145 (Vernon 2005).
199. Copeland, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 9836, at *2.
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of what [the trailer park owner] was about, and [the] Appellant was pre-
sent during the offense, his actions [sic] in taking away a tool does not
serve to demonstrate a contribution towards a common purpose. '200
Therefore, the court ruled that the evidence was legally insufficient to
demonstrate the appellant's participation in the offense.
VIII. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF LEGISLATION
On one hand, the 79th Texas Legislature did not pass any new major
environmental programs or initiatives, and some significant issues were
addressed, including permit reform, the use of compliance history in en-
forcement, and environmental flows (also referred to as in-stream water
rights). On the other hand, the session was eventful because the legisla-
ture passed many bills adjusting existing programs.
One of the programs that the legislature amended is the Dry Cleaner
Remediation Program, originally passed in the 78th session. House Bill
2376 redefines the terms "chlorinated dry cleaning solvent," "dry clean-
ing drop station," and "dry cleaning facility" to broaden the scope of fa-
cilities that are eligible for the remediation fund.20 1 The bill allows
registration fees to be paid quarterly and extends the deadline to Febru-
ary 2006 for dry cleaners to opt out of the fund.202 Finally, the bill re-
quires distributors of solvents to register with TCEQ, adds certain
enforcement powers, and directs TCEQ to adopt rules requiring dry
cleaners to implement specified performance standards.20 3
The legislature also made changes to the Leaking Underground Petro-
leum Storage Tank Remediation Program. Senate Bill 485 and House
Bill 1987 extend the deadline for submittal of site-closure requests until
September 2007,204 and extend the deadline for reimbursing eligible par-
ties who have met the statutory deadlines until 2008.205 These bills did
not change other applicable corrective-action deadlines. The bills also
remove the requirement that fuel transporters be held responsible for de-
positing motor fuel into underground storage tanks that lack TCEQ
certification.2o6
Texas has continued to strive to be a part of the FutureGen project, a
United States Department of Energy initiative to build the world's first
integrated carbon-dioxide-sequestration and hydrogen-production-re-
search power plant. House Bill 2201207 provides financial incentives and
a streamlined permitting process for clean-coal projects such as those
200. Id. at *14.
201. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 374.001 (Vernon 2005).
202. Id. § 374.102.
203. Id. § 374.103.
204. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.351(f)(6) (Vernon 2005).
205. See id. § 26.3573(s).
206. Id. § 7.156(c).
207. Tex. H.B. 2201, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005).
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contemplated by FutureGen.20 8 The bill defines a clean-coal project as a
coal-based electric-generating facility in partnership with the United
States Department of Energy's FutureGen project.20 9 The bill gives
TCEQ jurisdiction over clean-coal projects when carbon dioxide is in-
jected into a zone below the base of usable-quality water and would not
be productive of oil, gas, or geothermal resources.210 The Railroad Com-
mission has jurisdiction if the injection is into zones productive of oil, gas,
or geothermal resources.2 1' The bill also requires the Texas Water Devel-
opment Board ("TWDB") to adopt rules to allow the maximum amount
of flexibility possible to allow for the timely amendment or approval of a
regional or state water plan to facilitate planning for water supplies, in-
cluding water supplies needed for the demands of a clean-coal project.212
Another bill related to energy, Senate Bill 20, failed to pass during the
regular session, but passed during the first special session. Senate Bill 20
increases the renewable-energy target from 2,000 megawatts of genera-
tion by 2009 to 5,880 megawatts by 2015.213
Other environmental bills that passed during the 79th Legislative ses-
sion include:
B. SPECIFIC LEGISLATION AFFECTING SPECIFIC
ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIA
1. Air Emissions
* House Bill 2129214 simplifies the reporting requirements for emission
events by specifying that an emission event caused by one incident only
has to be reported as one event rather than one for each source of
emission. 2 15
* House Bill 2481 extends the Texas Emission Reduction Plan by two
years, to 2010.216 In addition, the bill directs TCEQ to adopt and incor-
porate by reference EPA's finalized version of the Clean Air Interstate
Rule and Clean Air Mercury Rule.217 The bill incorporates the NOx,
SO 2, and Hg trading provisions to the Health and Safety Code, and re-
quires TCEQ to promulgate rules for NOx and SO2 trading by September
2006, and Hg trading by October 2006.218
* House Bill 2793 created a program for the recovery of convenience
light switches from cars and trucks that will be turned in to scrap metal. 219
208. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.558 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
209. Id. § 5.001(4).
210. Id. § 27.022.
211. Id. § 27.038.
212. Id. § 16.053(r).
213. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.904(a) (Vernon 2005).
214. Tex. H.B. 2129, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005).
215. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.0215 (Vernon 2005).
216. Id. § 386.002.
217. Id. § 382.0173.
218. Id.
219. Id. §§ 375.001-.151.
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These switches, which are located under the hood or in the trunk, contain
mercury and are a target of EPA's expanding Clean Air Act program to
reduce mercury emissions.
* Senate Bill 1740 allows construction to begin before an air-quality-
permit amendment is issued. However, the bill specifies that the appli-
cant assumes responsibility for proceeding before a final decision.
220
2. Water Use
o House Bill 1208 prohibits a municipal utility district from exercising
its powers of eminent domain outside its boundaries for certain purposes,
including the acquisition of sites for water- or wastewater-treatment facil-
ities and recreational facilities.2 21
- House Bill 1225 provides an exemption from cancellation for nonuse
of a water right to the extent that the nonuse resulted from the imple-
mentation of water-conservation measures, as documented by an imple-
mentation submitted by the holder. 222
* House Bill 1763 sets forth uniform procedures to be utilized by
groundwater conservation districts regarding the notice and hearings pro-
cess for both rulemaking hearings and permit-application hearings.
2 23
The bill authorizes emergency rules under certain circumstances. 22 4 The
bill also authorizes groundwater conservation districts to use alternative
dispute-resolution procedures.
- House Bill 2430 requires the TWDB to establish a Rainwater Har-
vesting Evaluation committee to study the use of rainwater as a water
supply and to report back to the legislature by December 1, 2006. The
bill also requires TCEQ to establish standards for the domestic use of
rainwater.2 25
* Senate Bill 1354 establishes a pilot program containing specific per-
mitting and enforcement programs for a portion of the Brazos River. The
bill requires individual or general permits for quarries, depending on
their proximity to the river, and requires quarry operators to submit rec-
lamation and restoration plans while providing financial assurances to
mitigate damages from unauthorized discharges.2 2 6
3. Waste Issues
* House Bill 39 makes it a Class C misdemeanor to burn refuse in
certain counties on a lot that is located in a neighborhood or is smaller
220. Id. § 382.004.
221. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 54.209 (Vernon 2005).
222. Id. § 11.173(b).
223. Id. § 36.101.
224. Id. § 36.1011.
225. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 341.042 (Vernon 2005).
226. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 26.551-.562 (Vernon 2005).
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than five acres.227
* House Bill 580 authorizes a county to provide hazardous-materials
services when hazardous materials have been leaked, spilled, released, or
abandoned and charge the concerned party a reasonable fee.228
- House Bill 1287 allows a county to prevent illegal dumping in certain
circumstances and expedites a county's ability to address illegal dumping
and improve cost recovery. 229
9 House Bill 1609 clarifies that the twenty-ton-per-day limit for arid
exempt landfills applies to each type of waste rather that to the cumula-
tive quantity of waste. 230 The bill allows arid exempt landfills to occa-
sionally accept large amounts of debris without preventing the landfill
from accepting municipal solid waste.231
* House Bill 2131 allows certain political subdivisions and quasi-gov-
ernmental entities to rely on their own financial strength to demonstrate
financial assurance for solid-waste permitting before TCEQ.232
* Senate Bill 1281 prohibits a commercial industrial solid-waste facility
from receiving industrial solid waste for discharge into a publicly owned
treatment-works facility without first obtaining a permit from the
TCEQ. 233
* Senate Bill 1413 provides local governments with the authority to a
establish a brownfields fund through a tax or fee assessment.2 34
227. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.018 (Vernon 2005); TEX. Loc. GOV'T
CODE ANN. § 352.082 (Vernon 2005); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 42.12(16)(e)
(Vernon 2005).
228. TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 353.001-.005 (Vernon 2005).
229. Id. §8 343.013, 343.021, 343.022, 343.0235.
230. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.123 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
231. Id.
232. Id. § 361.0855.
233. Id. § 361.0901.
234. Id. § 361.901-.912.
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